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SECOND CLASS CITIZEN SOLDIERS: A PROPOSAL FOR
GREATER FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR
AMERICA'S MILITARY PERSONNEL

Emily Reuter*

"Are [the generals] free to speak? How come every time a general retires he
starts trashing the president's war policy, but doesn't say a word until he retires? In
other words, do we have to wait for retirement to hear what these guys think?"'
MSNBC's Hardball host Chris Matthews posed these questions to House
Majority Leader John Boehner in a September 2006 discussion on whether the
United States had sufficient troops on the ground in Iraq to control growing civil
violence.2 Matthews's query, raised as a challenge to the Bush administration's
willingness to incorporate military advice into Iraq military strategy, highlighted one
of the effects of free speech restrictions on members of the military.
Regulations restricting the free speech of active duty military members, both
inside and outside the line of duty, are not new. Congress adopted the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in its modern form in 1950.3 The UCMJ governs
all active duty military members, reservists, and, in certain circumstances, retired
members. 4 Several UCMJ articles either directly limit free speech or serve as a
means to enforce organizational policies that limit free speech.5
* J.D., William & Mary Law School, 2008. I would like to thank Professor Judy
Youngman, U.S. Coast Guard Academy, for her support, both with this article and throughout my career. Author is a Lieutenant in the U.S. Coast Guard. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the
Commandant or of the U.S. Coast Guard.
' Hardball with Chris Matthews (MSNBC television broadcast Sept. 27, 2006),
transcriptavailable at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15045586.
2

id.

3 Pub. L. No. 506,64 Stat. 107 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-940
(West Supp. 2007); see alsoDAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 40 (6th ed. 2004).
4 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL: UNITED STATES, Rule 202 (2005 ed.). Under the
purview of "military," the UCMJ applies to members of the Army, Navy, Marines, Air

Force, and the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard, under the Department of Homeland Security
rather than the Department of Defense, is defined as a military service by law in 14 U.S.C.A.
§ 1 (West Supp. 2007).
' Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter UCMJ] art. 88, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (Supp.
II 2002) ("Contempt toward officials"); UCMJ art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2000) ("Failure to
obey order or regulation"); UCMJ art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2000) ("Conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman"); UCMJ art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000) ("General article,"
which includes service-discrediting conduct).
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These restrictions traditionally go unnoticed during times of relative peace but
receive more scrutiny during conflicts. The last flurry of challenges to restrictive
military speech policies occurred during the Vietnam War. 6 As the Iraq War grows
increasingly unpopular, a repeat of Vietnam-era military free speech debate threatens.
The subject flared when a group of highly distinguished retired generals criticized the
Bush administration's handling of the conflict in 2003.' Former ground commanders
in Iraq and even active duty military members, speaking on the condition of
anonymity, publicly challenged former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's
ability to successfully lead the military and questioned administration strategy.8
The debate over free speech in the military is also highlighted by public scrutiny
of other military-specific First Amendment restrictions. Focus on the highly
contentious "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on homosexuality catapulted the name
of Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Rhonda Davis into national headlines when she was
discharged from the Navy for wearing her uniform to a same-sex marriage support
rally and announcing on a radio interview that she was gay.9 Christian groups,
especially evangelical Christians, are also pressuring the military to ease restrictions
on the content of prayers given at military functions. ° These arguments are
countered with concerns over the separation of church and state and the freedom not
to worship."'
The military response to charges of First Amendment violations is consistent.
Defenders argue that the UCMJ and military policies implemented under it exist "to
promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed
forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and
6

John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balance Between

PersonalRights and MilitaryNecessity, 45 A.F. L. REv. 303, 304 (1998).
7 Jim Rutenberg, Ex-GeneralsDefend TheirBluntComments, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,2003,

at B 1. Retired generals continue to criticize war strategy, oftentimes in groups. Fred Kaplan,
Challenging the Generals, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 26, 2007, at 34, 37.
8 David S. Cloud& Eric Schmitt, More RetiredGeneralsCallforRumsfeld'sResignation,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2006, at Al.

9 Davis was discharged after ten years of exemplary service. Vince Little, Ex-AFN Host
IsDischargedfromNavyfor"Don'tAsk, Don'tTell" Violation, STARS & STRIPES, July 31,2006,

availableat http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section= 104&article=38075&archive=true.
10 Alan Cooperman, Fasting ChaplainDeclares Victory, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2006, at
A 13 (describing the efforts of evangelical naval chaplain Lieutenant Gordon Klingenschmitt
to get the Bush administration to sign an executive order allowing military chaplains to pray
"in the name of Jesus").
" Press Release, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Americans
United Warns Military Officials Not to Promote Graham Evangelistic Rally (Aug. 8, 2005),
available at http://www.au.org/site/PageServer?pagename=press (follow "2005" press
archive hyperlink, then follow "August" hyperlink, then follow hyperlink with article's
name) (urging the military not to promote a seminar hosted by the Billy Graham Evangelistic
Association on "Serving God and Country" because it favors one religion over another and
is an unconstitutional governmental promotion of religion).
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thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States." 12 When servicemembers seek relief in the federal court system, the courts overwhelmingly defer to
the military's judgment.' 3 The Supreme Court labeled the military a special
community.' 4 The judiciary is reluctant to determine whether a military policy
violates the First Amendment because the issue ultimately requires an analysis of
whether the policy itself is so vital to military operations that it justifies the restraint
on First Amendment freedoms-something the courts consider themselves
unqualified to do. 5 Courts are quick to point out that the Constitution specifically
gives control of the military to the President as the Commander in Chief' 6 and grants
Congress oversight responsibility for maintenance and regulation of the military.' 7
As a result, rather than examine the claims under the traditional First Amendment
framework, the courts essentially analyze First Amendment complaints made against
the military with a rational basis test and uphold the military regulations."
This Note argues that although deference may be constitutionally given to the
military by the courts, Congress and military leaders have an obligation to protect
the First Amendment rights of servicemembers. Deference is not the equivalent of
a blank check for the military to make policies that suppress First Amendment
rights-specifically that of free speech-for convenient organizational control.
Military judges, who have the specialized military knowledge that federal courts
lack, should perform traditional First Amendment analysis within the military justice
context when faced with cases involving free speech. Federal courts, though they
may not be competent to review the substantive merits of a military court's decision,
should review appealed cases to ensure the use of appropriate legal analysis.
Moreover, as the defender of a free democratic society, the military should place
more emphasis on protecting the First Amendment rights of its members. The
military can provide such protection by carefully scrutinizing policies that restrict
First Amendment freedoms and by making the punishment for violating a policy
that restricts what is normally a First Amendment freedom an administrative rather
than criminal consequence under the UCMJ.
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of the purpose and creation of the
modem UCMJ, a discussion of the UCMJ articles used to limit speech, examples of
12 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL: UNITED STATES, supra note 4, Part 1(3) (describing
the nature and purpose of military law).
13 See, e.g., Kalyani Robbins, Framers'Intent andMilitary Power: Has Supreme Court

Deference to the Military Gone Too Far?, 78 OR. L. REV. 767, 775 (1999) (reciting a
paragraph's worth of Constitutional challenges made against military policy where the
Supreme Court gave deference to the military's judgment).
'4 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974).
'5 MARci A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 169 (2005).
16 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
'7 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-14.
18 Robbins, supra note 13, at 769-70.
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military organizational policies that restrict speech, and an examination of the
cultural impact of those regulations. Part II establishes the general principles
recognizing constitutional rights of troops, describes traditional judicial First
Amendment analysis, and contrasts civilian First Amendment analysis with judicial
treatment of servicemembers' First Amendment claims. Part I1 proposes recommendations that Congress and the military should implement to better protect the
First Amendment rights of service personnel. Part HII also includes a discussion of
the benefits of proactively protecting speech rights for the military and Congress.
I. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
A. History

Nineteenth-century military codes were narrowly tailored to military-specific
transgressions.' 9 Original military law did not encompass the wide breadth of
offenses, many of which overlap with civilian criminal offenses, that are included
in the modem UCMJ. 20 The first major focus on reforming military law into a more
comprehensive code that included criminal law occurred after World War 1.21 Army
Brigadier General Samuel T. Ansell, the senior assistant in the office of the Judge
Advocate General, led the reform movement. 22 Ansell theorized that legitimate
military order could be preserved only if servicemembers were treated justly and
believed that their superiors would administer discipline fairly. 23 He philosophized
that military leaders could preserve their service's integrity by promoting morals in
the troops through "appeal[ing] to ... the sense of self-respect and the principles of
citizenship upon which our patriotism rests. 24
Army Major General Enoch H. Crowder, Judge Advocate General at the end of
World War 1,25 vehemently contested Ansell's contention that "the soldier should
26
retain his rights as a citizen when he [takes] up arms in the service of his country."
Crowder argued that "the real purpose of the court-martial is to enable commanders

19 WILLAiI T. GENEROUS, JR., SWORDS AND SCALES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 167 (1973).
20 See id.
21 Fredric I. Lederer & Barbara Hundley Zeliff,

Needed: An Independent Military

Judiciary: A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, in EVOLVING
MILITARY JUSTICE 27, 31 (Eugene R. Fidell & Dwight H. Sullivan eds., 2002).
22 JOHN M. LINDLEY, "A SOLDIER IS ALSO A CrTIZEN":
THE CONTROVERSY OVER
MILITARY JUSTICE, 1917-1920, at 2 (1990).
23
24

Id. at 182.
Id. at 182-83.

25
26

Id. at 2.
Id. at211.
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to insure discipline in their forces. '27 The War Department, concurring with
Crowder, believed courts-martial should be controlled by experts in soldiering and
discipline, rather than legal professionals.2 8 Without the support of the War
Department, Congress did not embrace Ansell's progressive ideas.29
Public criticism of the military justice system during World War II inspired
renewed efforts to overhaul military law.3 ° The philosophies behind Ansell's and
Crowder's original debate again clashed, but reformers reached a compromise
between command control concerns and traditional notions of justice.3 Congress,
incorporating many of Ansell's ideas, approved the modem UCMJ in 1950.32
Despite a much improved military justice system, 33 the present-day debate over
protecting First Amendment rights of servicemembers echoes the original AnsellCrowder question: should servicemembers be treated as citizens, with emphasis on
protecting their constitutional rights within the military framework, or are they at the
mercy of decisions a commander deems are the best way to preserve military
discipline? Certainly, the answer is a balance between the two positions. The
struggle is to find and uniformly enforce that balance.
B. UCMJ Articles
There are four main articles in the modem UCMJ used to curtail free speech:
Article 88, "Contempt toward officials"; 34 Article 92, "Failure to obey order or
regulation"; 35 Article 133, "Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman"; 36 and
Article 134, "General article. 37
27
28
29

Id. at 165.
Id. at 165-66.
Id. at 175.

supra note 19, at 14-15. The large number of men in the military,
including many who were drafted involuntarily, produced over two million court-martial
convictions during World War II. Many of these convictions were considered "harsh and
inconsistent," and the personnel who ran them "were so often grossly inexperienced that
results were frequently a shame and a sham." Id. at 15.
"1Id. at 50-51.
32 LINDLEY, supra note 22, at 2.
3' The modem UCMJ incorporated qualification requirements for presiding officials, as
well as many of the procedural due process rights found in the civilian justice system,
including protections against self-incrimination and access to civilian appellate review.
Andrew S. Effron, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the UCMJ: The Legacy of the 1948
Amendments, in EVOLVING MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 171-72. Subsequent
Supreme Court rulings further extended civilian procedural due process rights to military
members. See infra Part II-A.
34 10 U.S.C. § 888 (Supp. II 2002).
31 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2000).
36 Id. § 933.
37 Id. § 934.
30 GENEROUS,
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Article 8838 is the article most offensive to the First Amendment. Article 88
applies only to commissioned officers and includes comments made during off-duty
hours as well as comments made while in uniform. 39 Article 88's application is so
broad that even an expression of personal opinion by an officer to his spouse, while
in their home, regarding, for example, his thoughts that the President made a poor
decision in a specific military operation could lead to prosecution. 4° In academia,
Article 88 is challenged as unconstitutionally vague, overly broad (statements made
in an official and private capacity), and overly narrow (the Article applies only to
commissioned officers). 4 '
Only one officer has been convicted at general court-martial under Article 88.42
The court in United States v. Howe found Army Lieutenant Henry Howe guilty of
violating Article 88 when he participated in a peace rally.4 3 Howe went to the rally
while off-duty." He wore civilian clothes and carried a sign that advocated withdrawal
of troops from Vietnam and voting out President Johnson. 45 Howe was sentenced to
hard labor for a year, required to forfeit all pay and allowances, and discharged from
the Army.46 In a similar recent case, Army Lieutenant Ehren Watada was charged,
in part, with two counts of Article 88 for statements made in conjunction with his
refusal to deploy to Iraq because he believed the war was illegal. 47 The Army
38

The statute reads:

Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the
President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Commonwealth,
or possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a
court-martial may direct.
10 U.S.C. § 888 (Supp. II 2002).
39 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL: UNITED STATES, supra note 4, at pt. IV,

I 12(c).
See John G. Kester, Soldiers Who Insult the President:An Uneasy Look atArticle 88
of the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1697, 1737-38 (1968) (noting
40

that although the Manual for Courts-Martial states that Article 88 should not be applied to
criticism vocalized as part of a private political conversation, the exception can be applied
only if the words used are "not personally contemptuous," which is not the case in most
discussions of political opinion).
" Richard W. Aldrich, Comment, Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: A
MilitaryMuzzle orJustaRestrainton MilitaryMuscle?, 33 UCLAL. REV. 1189,1198-1208
(1986); see also Kester, supra note 40, at 1697.
42 Aldrich, supra note 41, at 1199.
41 United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 555 (A.B.R. 1966).
44
41

Id. at 556.
Id. at 556-57.

4 Kester, supra note 40, at 1698-99.
47 Mike Barber, Watada Lawyer Sees Slim Hopes for Acquittal, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, July 11, 2006, at B2. The Army charged Watada with Article 88 for making
the following statements to the media:

"I could never conceive of our leader betraying the trust we had in him.
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ultimately decided not to prosecute Watada under Article 8848 but did court-martial
him for two counts of Article 133, "Conduct unbecoming an officer,"4 9 for making
critical comments about the Bush administration. ° The court-martial ended in a
mistrial when the military judge rejected a pre-trial agreement between the parties.5 '
Watada was scheduled to be tried again in October 2007, but a federal judge blocked
the trial pending a ruling on whether a second court-martial on the same charges
would constitute double jeopardy.52 If Watada is convicted, he will be the first
officer to be criminally punished for exercising free speech since Lieutenant Howe.
Defenders of Article 88 argue that it is "a means of ensuring civilian control of
the military and of assuring among military personnel a demeanor befitting the
53
subordinate role which the military traditionally has occupied in our society.
However, Article 88 has been used traditionally for incidents of internal military
insubordination, given that the President is at the top of the military chain of
command.54 These cases were not situations in which the member "actually posed
a serious threat to civilian authorities."55 Although full court-martial for violating
As I read about the level of deception the Bush administration used
to initiate and process this war, I was shocked. I became ashamed of
wearing the uniform. How can we wear something with such a timehonored tradition, knowing we waged war based on a
misrepresentation and lies? It was a betrayal of the trust of the
American people.... If the President can betray my trust, it's time for
me to evaluate what he's telling me to do," or words to that effect.
...

.I was shocked and at the same time ashamed that Bush had
planned to invade Iraq before the 9/11 attacks. How could I wear this
...

uniform now knowing we invaded a country for a lie?", or words

to that effect.
DD Form 458, Charge Sheet, redacted copy released July 5, 2006, http://www.lewis.army
.mil/paol/media.htm; see also News Release, U.S. Army I Corps & Fort Lewis, Charge
Sheet Lists Charges and Specifications (July 5, 2006) (on file with the William & Mary Bill
of Rights Journal).
48 Don Kramer, Watada to Face Court-Martial, Nw. GUARDIAN, Nov. 16, 2006,
availableat http://www.nwguardian.com/news/story/6235232p-5444993c.html.
49 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2000).
" Michael Gilbert, Watada Faces Fewer Charges, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Jan.
30, 2007, at B1.

"I William Yardley, MistrialforOfficer Who Refused to Go to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,

2007, at A19.
52

Hal Bernton, FederalJudge Tells Military to Halt Watada Court-Martial,SEATrLE

TIMES, Oct. 6, 2007, at Al. For more information on the Watada case, see John Kifner &
Timothy Egan, Officer FacesCourt-MartialforRefusing to Deploy to Iraq,N.Y. TIMES, July
23, 2006, at A19.
" Kester, supra note 40, at 1765.
54 Id.

11 Id. at 1765-66.
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Article 88 is unusual, the article is frequently cited for non-judicial punishment,5 6
and its mere existence chills officers' free speech."
Article 92, "Failure to obey order or regulation," is not a direct prohibition of
speech but covers any situation where a servicemember knowingly violates a lawful
general order.58 Article 92 states that "[a] general order or regulation is lawful
unless it is contrary to the Constitution... or for some other reason is beyond the
authority of the official issuing it."'59 Orders to perform military duties or acts are
presumed lawful. 6° However, these definitions indicate that courts, should consider
whether military orders or promulgated policies suppressing free speech are lawful.
The UCMJ qualifies that an "order may not, without such a valid military purpose,
interfere with private rights or personal affairs.",6 ' However, the generic justification
of "maintaining good order and discipline" that is accepted by the federal courts is
also readily accepted with little challenge by military courts.62 The focus of the

Id. at 1765. Non-judicial punishment (NJP) is an administrative discipline option
available to commanding officers by the UCMJ. UCMJ art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (Supp. II
2002). Members charged with "minor" infractions of the UCMJ are afforded an
administrative hearing. Id. § 815(e). If the commanding officer determines the member
committed the offenses charged, he can award punishments that include forfeiture of pay,
restriction to the military unit, and a reduction in rank. Id. § 815(b). The commanding officer
may also dismiss the charges without prejudice. Id. § 815(d). Punishment awarded at NJP
does not preclude the member from being court-martialled at a later date for the same
offenses. Id. § 815(f).
" Discipline through the encouragement of non-dissent in the military's culture is
reinforced by Article 88's threat of criminal sanction. Often, opinions not in complete
conformity with command perspective are considered insubordinate or unprofessional. The
strength of this discipline was reflected in the jury selection for the Watada court-martial.
Several potential jurors, all military officers, voiced opinions that it was "odd" that an officer
would question an order because it is an officer's duty to support military leadership; they
also said that they did not believe there was any justifiable reason for missing a deployment.
Adam Lynn, Watada Case Draws Crowds, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Feb. 6, 2007, at
56

A1; see Yardley, supra note 51.

The text of the statute reads:
Anyperson subject to this chapter who-(1) violates or fails to obey any
lawful general order or regulation; (2) having knowledge of any other
lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his
duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or (3)is derelict in the performance
of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
10 U.S.C. § 892 (2000).
58

9 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTAL: UNITED STATES, supra note 4, at pt. IV, I 16(c)(1)(C).
6 Id. at 14(c)(2)(a)(I).
61 Id. at 14(c)(2)(a)(iii).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 33 M.J. 797, 799 (A.C.M.R. 1991) (noting that

military courts follow the Supreme Court's grant of extreme deference to military necessity

when examining the First Amendment rights of servicemembers).
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military adjudicators is that the accused violated an order; scrutiny of whether the
order or regulation's restriction of free speech is actually constitutional is lost.
A similar problem lies with the general article of the UCMJ, Article 134.63
Article 134 is considered the catch-all charge because it includes "all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces." 64 Akin to Article 134, but constrained to officers and officers in training, is Article 133, "Conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman. 6 5 Article 133 reads, "Any commissioned officer, cadet, or
midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall
be punished as a court-martial may direct." 66 The doctrine of preemption prohibits
Articles 134 and 133 from being used when one of the elements of the enumerated
UCMJ offenses cannot be proven.67 However, the articles are still effective tools for
prosecuting speech or conduct not specifically prohibited under Articles 88 or 92 but
that a local military command feels is inappropriate and thus "discrediting."
C. OrganizationalPolicies
In addition to its legal framework, the military also curtails free speech rights
with certain organizational policies. The limitation of political speech, which is
buttressed by Article 88, is one of the more prominent examples. Department of
Defense (DOD) Directive 1344.10 includes a laundry list of prohibited political
speech, including participating in partisan political campaigns, soliciting votes or
doing research for a partisan organization, and participating "in any radio, television,
or other program or group discussion as an advocate... of a partisan political party,
candidate, or cause., 6' The regulations allow for a member to "express a personal

Article 134 states:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces,
and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this
chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general,
special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree
of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.
10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000).
64 id.
65 Id. § 933. The article clarifies that "[a]s used in this article, 'gentleman' includes both
63

male and female commissioned officers, cadets, and midshipmen." MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL: UNITED STATES, supra note 4, at pt. IV, 59(c)(1).
66 10 U.S.C. § 933.
67 MANUALFOR COURTS-MARTIAL: UNITED STATES, supranote 4, at pt. IV, 60(c)(5)(a).
68 Dep't of Defense Directive 1344.10, Political Activities by the Armed Forces on Active
Duty 10 (Aug. 2, 2004). The U.S. Coast Guard has nearly identical regulations in UNITED
STATES COAST GUARD PERSONNEL MANUAL, COMDTINST M1000.6A, Ch. 16.C (2005).
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opinion on political candidates and issues,"'69 but such expressions cannot include
"contemptuous words against the officeholders" prohibited by UCMJ Article 88.70
This caveat pressures military members to express only those personal political
views that support incumbent politicians.7
The military organizational structure also allows commanders to issue orders at
the local level.72 These orders can restrict speech as a convenient means to address
local discipline concerns, even in a preemptive manner.73 Ethredge v. Hailprovides
an example of a specific order that curtailed free speech on an individual base by
prohibiting bumper stickers or similar expressions that "embarrass or disparage the
Commander in Chief."74 The plaintiff who brought the First Amendment suit was
a civilian employee on the base,75 but the court's reaction exemplifies the deference
given to military orders. The court determined that the order was justified by the
need to protect "military order and morale," because there had been an anonymous
threat to break the plaintiff's truck windows due to the bumper sticker. 76 Commentators noted that the threat used to justify the order was illegal, and in upholding the
military's order, the court was unusually willing to bow to a "heckler's veto" and
disfavor the speech right.77 The ability of local commanders to restrict expression
for disciplinary control minimizes First Amendment freedoms because it permits
speech regulation as a disciplinary tool and encourages the overly broad speech
restrictions without consideration of the constitutional implications.
D. Effect on Military Culture
I

Despite such a generous delegation of regulations of personal freedoms to the
military, Congress and the courts do not require a safety mechanism to protect
against intentional or unwitting abuse of that delegation. The overreaching control
of free speech is juxtaposed against the expectation that servicemembers should still
fully engage and interact in civilian society. Military members retain their
citizenship status-in fact, for some security clearances, they must revoke all other
70

Dep't of Defense Directive 1344.10, supra note 68, at 9.
Id. at 11.

71

Aldrich, supra note 41, at 1210.

69

See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 164 (2000) (granting combatant commanders the authority to
delegate responsibilities to subordinate commands as necessary).
71 See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). The Court declared that "Itihere is
nothing in the Constitution that disables a military commander from acting to avert what he
perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under
his command" in a case in which base regulations prohibiting partisan political speech and
requiring prior approval to distribute literature were challenged. Id. at 840.
14 56 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 1995).
72

75 Id.
76
77

Id. at 1325, 1328.
Carr, supra note 6, at 343.
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citizenships held.7" Outside enumerated limitations on political participation,
military members can still vote and when off-duty they are expected to live and
interact in civilian society." Their pledge to subjugate certain rights in order to
serve is done with great trust. The modem UCMJ gave servicemembers many of the
constitutional protections afforded their civilian counterparts, but the Code still
allows commanders at the unit level to use their discretion in applying the rules or
developing policy."0 All too often, this policy is a result of what the commander
judges is the most effective means of achieving a perceived military need rather than
an evaluation of rights protection versus the military goal.8 Certainly there are
situations, such as combat, that preclude commanders from making a measured
analysis, but failure to perform this analysis is unjustified when dealing with free
speech rights in non-urgent contexts.
One of the more disturbing examples of free speech curtailment by a local
commander occurred in 1990 when the Marine Corps reassigned Sergeant Christine
Hilinski from her position, reduced her salary, and gave her a negative performance
report because of her testimony as a defense witness at a court-martial.82 She
Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245 § 3.1(b) (Aug. 2, 1995) ("[E]ligibility
for access to classified information shall be granted only to employees who are United
78

States citizens.... ."); see, e.g., Memorandum from the Sec'y of the Navy, Dep't of the Navy

personnel security program, SECNAVINST 5510.30A, G.8-G.9 (Mar. 10, 1999) (explaining
that dual citizenship is an indication of a preference for a foreign country that could render
the individual susceptible to sharing information or making other decisions that are harmful
to the United States).
" Most military bases do not have adequate housing on base to host all members
assigned to the command. Members receive a basic allowance for housing (BAH) to
compensate for the increased cost of living off base. Information is distributed on how to
adapt to a new community, and volunteering in the civilian community is encouraged. See,
e.g., UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, MEDALS AND AWARDS MANUAL, COMDTINST

M1650.25C, 5-11 to -13 (2002) (describing the qualifications for Military Outstanding
Volunteer Service Medal, which is awarded for exemplary volunteer involvement with the
civilian community); Air Force Crossroads, Relocation, http://www.afcrossroads.com
/relocation/military.cfm (last visited Aug. 28, 2007) (providing links to information on
moving allowances, communities around military communities, and off-base housing real
estate); Office of the Sec'y of Defense, Military Compensation, http://www.defenselink
.mil/militarypay/pay/bahlindex.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2007) (describing when members
are entitled to BAH and providing links to BAH pay tables).
'o See MANUALFOR COURTS-MARTIAL: UNITED STATES, supra note 4, at Rule 5, 404-07

(discussing commanders' options in the disposition or dismissal of charges).
"1 See Donald N. Zillman & Edward J. Imwinkelried, ConstitutionalRights and Military
Necessity: Reflections on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 396, 409-10 (1976)

(noting, in a discussion of Vietnam-era military speech restrictions, that "many commanders
may abuse [their] authority and .

.

. overreact to servicemen's expression of unpopular

views" out of a "fear[] of criticism").
82

Tamar Lewin, Marine Sues Navy over a Demotion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1990, at A16.
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testified under oath that a colleague who was accused of having an inappropriate
3
homosexual relationship with a subordinate "did a fine job" as a drill instructor.1
Hilinski also testified that she did not believe homosexual behavior was acceptable
between seniors and subordinates in the Marine Corps.' As a direct result of her
testimony, Hilinski's unit fired her, stating that the command lost confidence in her
ability to enforce the Marine Corps rules in her role as a drill instructor. 85 The unit
also punitively reassigned another drill instructor who testified as a character witness
for the accused at the same court-martial.86 The Court of Military Appeals, upon
review of the original court-martial, determined that the punitive actions of Hilinski's
command were unlawful. However, the command's actions so negatively impacted
Hilinski's career that she resigned nearly a year before the court issued its findings.88
Although the Court of Military Appeals later determined Hilinski's command's
actions were an unlawful restriction on her free speech, no one in her command
recognized that fact when the decision was made. Hilinski's case is a classic
example of how the military's dismissal of constitutional rights in local command
decisions can result in rights violations that also destroy a member's career. In this
case, the local command's overreaching action was not overruled by a military court
until after Hilinski left the service." In an everyday context, the knowledge that
commanders can take virtually any action that could stagnate careers based on
speech, even speech given truthfully under oath in a courtroom, creates an
environment of tight control. This kind of control leads many members to believe
that they have even fewer free speech rights than are technically provided. The
federal courts' clear deference to military policies sends a signal to military
members that efforts to assert their speech rights are futile. 9° Not all policy
restrictions on free speech are necessarily made to restrict constitutional rights, but
the general lack of review means servicemembers' rights are perhaps the most
vulnerable of any legal member of American society.9
Id.
8 Id.
83

85

Id.

86

Id.
United States v. Jameson, 33 M.J. 669, 675-77 (N-M.C.M.R. 1991).
Lewin, supra note 82. Hilinski did successfully petition the Navy for backpay and

87
88

reinstatement of her good service record. News Release, ACLU, Marine Wins Back Pay,
Reinstatement, (July 31, 1990), availableat http://www.skepticfiles.org/aclu/07_31-90.htm.
89 Lewin, supra note 82.
90 See Jonathan Lurie, The Role of the Federal Judiciary in the Governance of the
American Military: The United States Supreme Court and "Civil Rights and Supervision"
over the Armed Forces, in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989, at 405, 406 (Richard H. Kohn ed., 1991) ("Part of the
reason for the paucity of cases is that relatively few have been filed.").
9' Linda Sugin, Note, FirstAmendment Rights ofMilitary Personnel:Denying Rights to
Those Who Defend Them, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 855, 861 (1987).
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II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS

A. ConstitutionalRights of Servicemembers
The Founding Fathers did not indicate what they believed was the appropriate
balance between military necessity and the constitutional rights of servicemembers.92 Jaded from interaction with the King's army, colonists were strongly
anti-military, and it is likely that the Framers' efforts focused on justifying
provisions for armed forces in the Constitution and not on the extent to which the
Bill of Rights should extend to individual soldiers.93 However, the suspicion of a
strong military indicates that the Framers did not intend for the armed forces to have
autonomy immune from review by the other bodies of government, especially in the
realm of justice and criminal punishments.94 This assertion is further strengthened
when one considers that the early American armed forces depended on citizen
soldiers who took to arms in the emerging nation's defense because they were
citizens, fighting for the exact freedoms and rights limited by military membership
in the modem armed forces. 95 Indeed, the proposition that American servicemembers
forfeit the very freedoms they pledge their lives to protect is perversely ironic.
As the concept of a standing army developed, the courts gradually recognized
that servicemembers were protected by the Constitution.96 Initially reluctant to even
review a military case,97 the Supreme Court gradually upheld Fifth and Sixth
Amendment due process rights for servicemembers in military trials. 98 In 1938, the
Supreme Court ruled that military members were entitled to Sixth Amendment
protections in Johnson v. Zerbst.99 The Zerbst petitioners were members of the
Marine Corps who were arrested for counterfeiting money. 10 They filed a habeas
corpus petition alleging that the military's failure to afford them counsel in a
criminal trial violated their Sixth Amendment rights.' "° The Court agreed and
expanded its own purview "by holding that if at any point during litigation the
92

See Barney F. Bilello, Note, JudicialReview and Soldiers' Rights: Is the Principleof

Deference a Standardof Review?, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 465, 472 (1989).
9'See id.

9'See Robbins, supra note 13, at 786.
9'See LINDLEY, supra note 22, at 1.
96

See Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).

17 See Dynes v. Hoover, 61

U.S. (20 How.) 65,82-83 (1857) (declaring that court-martial
verdicts could not be reviewed by federal courts unless the military court acted outside its
jurisdiction).
98

See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

99 Id.
'0oId.

at 459-60.
o1Id. at 459.
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defendant was deprived of some basic constitutional right, jurisdiction was lost by
the court which perpetrated the denial.' 0 2 Zerbst provided servicemembers a
recourse for the denial of constitutional rights in trial.
A plurality decision in Burns v. Wilson"°3 confirmed due process rights in the
military."° The plurality noted that although civil courts did not have the technical
expertise to decide the necessary balance between rights and discipline in the
military, they did have "the limited function.., to determine whether the military
[courts] have given fair consideration to each of [the defendant's] claims.' 13 5 This
decision established the ability of civilian courts to review military cases for
questions of law.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the federal courts consistently held
that many constitutional guarantees in the civilian justice system must be present in
military trials."° Although the courts are less likely to mandate specific application
of constitutional rights to individual members of the military, other procedural
requirements in the civil justice system, such as the reading of UCMJ Article 31 (b)
rights (the military version of a Miranda warning) are also required in the
military. 10 7 Despite laying this groundwork, the Court declined to extend this
philosophy to the context of First Amendment rights.
B. TraditionalFirstAmendment Analysis
Outside of the military context, government actions that curtail speech typically
receive the most judicial scrutiny.' Courts apply strict scrutiny review to laws that
limit speech in public forums based on content, requiring the government to prove
that there is a compelling government interest to justify the law."° Courts require
that regulation of content-neutral speech in public forums "be narrowly tailored to
further significant or substantial government interests, and alternative means of
communication must be available."" 0 Safeguarding free speech is a dominant focus
of the Supreme Court."'
Some speech is not protected by the First Amendment. Unprotected speech
usually occurs when the speech does not qualify as fulfilling one of the three
GENEROUS, supra note
103 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
l04 GENEROUS, supra note
102

19, at 168.

19, at 174.
Bums, 346 U.S. at 144.
106 Lurie, supra note 90, at 417.
107 See id. at 416-17.
'0' C. Thomas Dienes, When the FirstAmendment Is Not Preferred:The Military and
Other "Special Contexts," 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 779,781 (1988).
105

'09

Id.

110Id.

..
' DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 13 (1998).
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generally accepted functions of free speech: enlightenment, self-fulfillment, or the
safety valve function." 2 "Unprotected" speech includes fighting words, instigation
of violence, defamation and libel, obscenity, and, to a certain extent, commercial
advertising." 3 The courts also allow additional restrictions on First Amendment
speech in custodial institutions including public schools' and prisons" 5 and for
public employees." 6 Overall, even evaluating speech, the Court demands "special
clarity and precision of regulation" to justify speech restrictions, imposes "[s]pecial
procedural requirements," and provides articulate and thorough First Amendment
analysis to explain its decision.'
The glaring exception to the Court's detailed First Amendment cases is its
treatment of military free speech claims. Asserting the political question doctrine
or a lack of expertise, the Court consistently refuses to engage in a First Amendment
analysis of how and why speech is permissibly limited in the military." 8
C. Evolution of Court Deference to the Military
Judicial deference in military First Amendment cases stems from a long history
of deference to the military in general. One of the earliest cases in which the Court
defined its reluctance to interfere with the military was Dynes v. Hoover."9 Dynes
involved a member of the Navy who was imprisoned after being found guilty of
attempted desertion at a general court-martial. 20 Dynes sued the federal marshal
who incarcerated him for trespass and false imprisonment, arguing that "attempting
to desert was in fact a totally different offense than [the charged crime of] actual
112

Aldrich, supra note 41, at 1192.

"13

FARBER, supra note 111, at 14.

CompareTinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding
that schools must prove that the expression they seek to regulate substantially threatens to
interrupt school activities or interferes with the rights of others), with Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (allowing school-sponsored activities, such as a
student newspaper, to be censored by the school "so long as [the administration's] actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns").
"' Prisons are essentially subject to the Hazelwood test but as applied to virtually all
speech within their walls. FARBER, supra note 111, at 190; see Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401 (1989) (allowing federal prisons to censor the receipt of outside publications that
were deemed a threat to prison security); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)
(limiting the prison's ability to regulate speech by censoring letters written by inmates).
116 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (holding that there is no First
Amendment protection for employees who are disciplined for speech made pursuant to their
official work duties).
7 Dienes, supra note 108, at 781-82.
18 See Robbins, supra note 13, at 788-95.
"4

"9

20

61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).

Id. at 77.
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desertion .... Since the lesser charge did not appear to be within the specified articles
of the Act to Govern the Navy, the court-martial had no jurisdiction in this case."''
The sailor's arguments were unpersuasive to the Supreme Court, which relied
on Article I of the Constitution to validate Congress's power to create a military
justice system unique from the civilian courts established under Article I. 122 The
Court ruled that the decision of a general court-martial fell outside the jurisdiction
of the federal courts for review unless the appellant could establish that the military
court either did not have subject matter jurisdiction or, if it had jurisdiction, that the
court's procedures failed to adhere to statutorily required protocol. 2 3 Despite
articulating a clear test, many courts and commentators tended to omit the second
24
part of the analysis, resulting in little relief for military appellants. 1
The passage of the modern UCMJ provided servicemembers the right of civilian
appellate review, 125 and subsequent cases established procedural due process rights
for military members. 126 However, the Court continued its pattern of deference in
Burns v. Wilson. 127 The Court in Burns issued four separate, somewhat cryptic
opinions which recognized that servicemembers do have constitutional rights,
including First Amendment protections.
However, the Justices noted that
servicemembers' rights receive abridged protection based on military necessity. 2 9
The Court did not articulate when constitutional restrictions might be proper or how
to review orders that abridge rights. Instead, the Court noted that Congress
painstakingly developed a comprehensive military justice system and that federal
courts should respect military judges' decisions. 30
The Court established its explicit position of deference to the military in the
realm of First Amendment rights during the Vietnam War when several military
First Amendment free speech cases appeared before federal appellate courts and the
3
Supreme Court.1 '
Parkerv. Levy 132 was the Court's landmark decision for deference in the context
of servicemembers' First Amendment rights. 133 Captain Levy, an Army physician,
refused to train Special Forces aid men and publicly voiced his reservations about
12'
122
123
124
121
126
127
121

129
130
'i1

132

1'

Lurie, supra note 90, at 407.
Lederer & Zeliff, supra note 21, at 31.
GENEROUS, supra note 19, at 165.
Id. at 167.
UCMJ art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2000).
See supra Part 11-A.
346 U.S. 137 (1953); see supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
Sugin, supra note 91, at 864 & n.62.
Id. at 864.
Burns, 346 U.S. at 140-42.
See Sugin, supra note 91, at 865-71.
417 U.S. 733 (1974).
Sugin, supra note 91, at 865.
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the Vietnam War on base.' 34 The Court upheld Captain Levy's court-martial
conviction on charges of UCMJ Article 90, for "willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer," Article 133, for "Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," and Article 134, for acts prejudicial to good order and discipline, over the
petitioner's free speech claim.'3 5
Levy argued that Articles 133 and 134 violated the Due Process Clause by being
unfairly vague and that they violated the First Amendment because they were overly
broad. 36 The Court avoided traditional discussion of the First Amendment and
instead deferred to Congress's approval of the UCMJ articles. 137 The Court noted
the military's uniqueness from civilian society and determined that because of that
difference, the standard of review for vagueness should be the same as it is for
criminal codes in economic affairs. 138 Under the economic affairs standard, a
regulation is void for vagueness only if the defendant could not reasonably
39
determine that his actions were forbidden. 1
Thus, Parker established a standard of review for vagueness and overbreadth
challenges of military laws, albeit one that did not articulate an analytical framework
to determine the constitutionality of laws and regulations challenged under the First
Amendment.'4 Federal courts subsequently applied Parker'slogic that the military has
the right to restrict constitutional rights, even with the most removed claims of military
necessity, in cases that did not involve an overbreadth or vagueness challenge."
Although controversy over First Amendment rights and the military quieted
with the end of the Vietnam war, 142 the debate reemerged after the Goldman v.
Weinberger decision in 1986.14 Goldman was a Jewish Air Force captain who filed
a Free Exercise complaint after the Air Force prohibited him from wearing a
yarmulke because of a regulation prohibiting the wearing of headgear by members
indoors.' 44 Goldman wore the yarmulke for four years before he was specifically
ordered to cease wearing it. 145 The specific order to stop wearing the yarmulke was
given in response to the complaint of defense counsel at a court-martial where
Goldman testified as a witness.' 46 In a five to four decision, the Court upheld the

3 Parker,417 U.S. at 735-37.
Id. at 733-34.
136 Sugin, supra note 91, at 866.
137 Id.
138 Parker,417 U.S. at 756-57.
'"I

"9 Id. at 757.
'4
Sugin, supra note 91, at 867.
'4' Id. at 868; see also Bilello, supra note 92, at 486-87.
142 Carr, supra note 6, at 304.
43 475 U.S. 503 (1986); HAMILTON, supra note 15, at 171.
'44 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 504-05.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 505.
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Air Force regulation." 7 The majority did not address the constitutional claim and
deferred, without First Amendment analysis, to the military's judgment in the need
for uniformity. 4 '
The Goldman decision solidified the standard that in military First Amendment
cases, the Court gives only cursory treatment to "determin[ing] whether the military
[courts] have given fair consideration to each of [the defendant's] claims" and
emphasizes instead its generic reasoning of complete deference to the military.'49
As one academic observed after the Goldman decision:
[T]he Court has never explicitly defined the circumstances in
which constriction of first amendment rights is proper, the
permissible extent of the abridgment of constitutional rights, nor
the governmental interest necessary to override the interest of
the individual. . . [W hat began as a weak but substantive
review has degenerated into virtually no review at all.'5 0
If the Court upholds all military regulations that restrict free speech, do servicemembers really have First Amendment protections?' The Court's declaration that
servicemembers have some First Amendment protections appears superficial given
the Court's reluctance to perform any critical review of challenged military regulations or policies. 52 Without a clear standard of review that articulates exactly
what servicemembers must prove to successfully establish a First Amendment claim,
the Court discourages servicemembers from embarking on an almost certainly
hopeless attempt to preserve their constitutional rights. '5 The Court's decisions
raise the concern that "a majority of the Supreme Court has tacitly concluded that
servicemembers lose the protections of the Bill of Rights for the duration of their
military service. ' ' "M
Servicemembers are especially unprotected, because they do not have the
remedies for workplace injustices that civilians have. For example, military
members who believe their constitutional rights were violated by their superior
147

Id. at 510.

148

Id.

Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 144 (1953).
Sugin, supra note 91, at 864-65.
'5' See FARBER, supra note 111, at 192-93 (observing that the
Court has never found a
military regulation that it did not like).
12 Bilello, supra note 92, at 467.
"' Id.; see also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 787 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(discussing the inadequacy of the majority's deference to the military and the majority's
failure to answer the real question of "whether the serviceman has the same right as his
civilian counterpart to be informed as to precisely what conduct those rules proscribe before
he can be criminally punished for violating them").
114 Bilello, supra note 92, at
467.
"'

1S0
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officers cannot sue them for damages in civil court.'

The Court forbade such suits

because they are inappropriate in the context of unique military senior-subordinate
relationships and the need for discipline.' 56 The Court warned against civilian court
interference "with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel
and their superior officers"' 5 7 and emphasized that the military has a system for
bringing complaints against superiors.'58
The Court glossed over the fact that the system for redress within the military
is that a complaint must be given to a regular line officer before it is given to an
officer exercising court-martial jurisdiction. 159 Keeping with precedent, the Court
refused to examine whether the petitioner's constitutional rights were violated or
whether the Navy provided the proper means of redress.6 ° The Court emphasized
that the Constitution placed military justice oversight in the hands of Congress and
that, as long as Congress did not establish a system of redress for constitutional
rights violation complaints, the Court would not intervene out of respect for the

separation of powers.161
I1. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BETTER PROTECTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
IN THE MILITARY
A. Recommendationsfor Change
Frustratingly, while the courts wait for Congress to take the lead on prioritizing
a rights-protection framework for military members, Congress tends to wait for a
high publicity case before it shoulders that responsibility. Congress passed a law
requiring an exemption for the wearing of religious headgear after the Goldman
decision. 62 Shortly after a Naval Chaplain was found guilty at court-martial of
disobeying an order by giving a prayer in uniform at a religious event outside the
White House, 163 members of Congress tried to pass "a provision that would allow
'

See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).

156

Id. at 303-04.

'17

Id. at 300.

'58 Id. at 302-03 (citing UCMJ art. 138, 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2000) "Complaints of Wrongs").
' Id. The military rank structure and focus on discipline inherently discourages
complaints about a supervisor to another superior, especially when the complainant is a
lower-ranked enlisted person. The control superiors have over promotion and disciplinary
sanctions can discourage reports of misconduct, especially in an environment, such as a ship
or otherwise deployed unit, where the complainant potentially faces months of close-quarters
interaction with the very person about whom he or she is expressing concerns.
'60 See id. at 304.
161 See id.
162 HAMILTON, supra note 15, at 171.
163 Alan Cooperman, Navy ChaplainGuilty of Disobeying an Order,WASH. POST, Sept.

15, 2006, at A3.
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military chaplains to offer sectarian prayers at nondenominational military
events."' 64 A reactionary Congress combined with a deferential judiciary does
nothing to prevent speech violations or to improve the environment of restricted
speech that permeates the military.
Despite harsh criticism for its deferential stance, 1 65 the Supreme Court is
resolute in its deference to the military on First Amendment complaints of
servicemembers. Congress, then, as the body to which the Constitution entrusts
regulation of the military, should protect First Amendment rights within the
military." 6 Rather than consider the protection of rights only in reaction to high
profile cases, Congress should take a proactive approach and develop a framework
for the protection of servicemembers' constitutional rights.
There are three main actions Congress should take to define First Amendment
rights for servicemembers and to promote First Amendment consciousness within
the military: (1) promulgate guidelines to promote internal policing of expressionlimiting policies within the military; (2) require military courts to do traditional
First Amendment analysis, with adjustments for compelling military interest, when
faced with a free speech claim; and (3) decriminalize the punishments for violation
of expression-restricting policies. These changes would internally reduce overreaching speech policies in the military, provide a legitimate framework for
servicemembers to redress First Amendment violations, and avoid inflicting a
criminal penalty on citizens exercising freedoms that, outside of the UCMJ, are
considered legal rights.
1. Congressional Emphasis on Internal First Amendment Protection in
the Military
To promote a greater emphasis on protecting the First Amendment rights within
the military organization, Congress should mandate that military leaders consider
the First Amendment as part of their decisionmaking rubric when initially formulating
" Neela Banerjee, Proposalon Military Chaplains and PrayerHolds Up Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A19.
165 For a representative criticism of the Court's deference under the reasoning that it lacks
military expertise, see Bilello, supra note 92, at 480 (noting that "[tihe federal courts are
called upon daily to review... complex controversies [where] the extent of the court's
technical knowledge is no greater than that which can be obtained from.., the litigants").
For a representative criticism of the Court's continual refusal to articulate a clear standard
of review for military-related First Amendment complaints, see Goldman v. Weinberger,475
U.S. 503,529-33 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should "articulate
and apply an appropriate standard... and should examine [the petitioner's] claim in light of
that standard").
"6 The Constitution explicitly gives Congress the powers "To raise and support Armies,"
"To provide and maintain a Navy," and "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-14.
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policies and orders and when evaluating potential disciplinary infractions. Consideration of First Amendment rights when making policies or giving orders related to
First Amendment issues merely requires commanders to consider the true reasons
for the proposed expression-restricting policies. Unless the speech rises to the level
of disrespect for the rank structure or some other articulated threat to unit
effectiveness, commanders should allow the speech and exercise other leadership
methods to manage the expression.167 Free speech consciousness can be raised
throughout military leadership through training programs.
The other internal check on overreaching speech restrictions occurs when a
commander believes there is a disciplinary infraction. If the speech rises to the level
of breaching military laws, then the member should be charged with the specific
law, rather than hiding the content of the infringement under a general article or
Article 92, "Failure to obey order or regulation."'' 68 The Watada trial again serves
as an example. Lieutenant Watada's public statements, originally the basis of
Article 88169 charges, were incorporated into four counts of Article 133,170 "Conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman."'' Interestingly, prior to the mistrial, the
military dropped two of the four counts to avoid a free-press fight with the
journalists the court would have subpoenaed to prove Watada was the source of the
statements. 7 2 As for the remaining charges, the military judge ruled that Watada
could not present evidence as to why he believed he had the right to make his public
statements.173 The military can better ensure just adjudication, at least for officers,
if improper speech is charged under Article 88, "Contempt towards officials," rather
than under a general article.
If the expressive conduct that allegedly violates an order or a general article
does not fall under Article 88, the military should still emphasize First Amendment
considerations. When expressive acts are grouped into the disobedience of an order
or a general article, the punitive proceedings focus on whether that order was
technically disobeyed, rather than whether the order permissively prohibited speech
in the first place.'7 4 By focusing solely on the technical violation of the order or
One method could include, simply, tolerance of the expression, especially if it is only
tangentially related to the member's actual work environment.
161 See UCMJ art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2000) ("Conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman"); UCMJ art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000) ("General article," prohibiting servicediscrediting conduct); UCMJ art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2000).
169 10 U.S.C. § 888 (Supp. II 2002) ("Contempt toward officials").
170 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2000).
1' Gilbert, supra note 50.
172 See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
1' Gilbert, supra note 50.
114 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 58 M.J. 466 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (accused convicted
under UCMJ Article 92, "Failure to obey order or regulation," for talking with civilian galley
workers after commander ordered that military members not talk to the civilian help).
167
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whether the action could be considered service-discrediting, unit commanders
issuing non-judicial punishment forgo examining the lawfulness of the order.
However, the law requires that military orders be consistent with the Constitution.'
Thus, military officers adjudicating claims of an orders violation by a servicemember's expressive conduct should first assess the constitutionality of the order
and whether it was a permissible infringement of First Amendment rights and
then-only if the order is legitimate-consider the technical violation.
Although the implementation of these internal First Amendment reviews will
require a shift away from a traditional control mechanism and, for some commanders, from their leadership philosophies, the changes are relatively low-cost, highyield cultural changes that will safeguard free speech rights. The emphasis of First
Amendment considerations in non-judicial punishment disciplinary proceedings are
particularly important because that is where the majority of charges for violations
176
of the UCMJ are resolved.
2. Implementation of Traditional First Amendment Analysis in Military Courts
To complement the internal focus on First Amendment rights in the military,
Congress should direct the military justice system to review free speech complaints
under a traditional strict scrutiny analysis. Implementing civilian free speech
analysis would not be difficult for military judges because the Supreme Court has
established a clear framework for the adjudication of free speech claims.' 77 Naturally,
free speech analysis done in a military context will be less deferential to the free
speech advocate than traditional civilian analysis.'
Due to the military's role in
national defense and the discipline needed to execute that mission successfully, there
are compelling government purposes that may trump First Amendment claims in a
military context that normally would not prevail in a civilian context. For example,
a member who criticizes a mission plan or objective in a combat-deployed unit
while in the process of executing that plan or objective would likely not be protected
even with a heightened standard of review. 179 This "military strict scrutiny" for First
Amendment claims would require the military to prove that an order or policy is
'
176

MANUALFOR COURTS-MARTIAL: UNrrED STATES, supra note 4, at pt. IV, I16(c)(1 )(c).
See, e.g., UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE CODE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE SEC. 3 app. (2005), available at

http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/annual/FY05AnnualReport.pdf. The Army reported 45,299
cases of non-judicial punishment versus 1252 courts-martial for fiscal year 2005. Id.
...See supra Part fl-B.
78 The various tests for civilian speech tend to favor speech unless there is a narrowly
tailored policy for a compelling governmental objective. See Dienes, supra note 108, at 782-85.
'9
See Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 81, at 405 (discussing the military's
argument that members who protest or do not respond quickly to lawful orders in a combat
zone result in an ineffective fighting force).
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necessary to achieve a compelling purpose and that there is not a less restrictive
alternative, but it would also allow exceptions for restrictions that have provable
direct impact on military readiness.' 80
Requiring military courts to utilize the free speech analysis resolves many of the
Supreme Court's concerns about civilian court review of military First Amendment
challenges.' ' Military court judges are commissioned officers and are thus familiar
with military operations.1 82 There is no separation of powers or political question
concern because the military would police itself at the bequest of Congress. Most
importantly, requiring courts-martial to include traditional First Amendment analysis motivates the military judiciary to prioritize servicemembers' constitutional
rights. Military courts will be forced to examine closely the underlying issues of
why an order was disobeyed, whether that order was lawful to begin with, and
whether "service discrediting" is being mistaken for uncomfortable, but not prohibited, service criticism.1 83 The military justice system can do its own initial review
of law through the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces,' 84 the
civilian-staffed appellate court for the military.88 Federal courts could still review an
appeal of the military court's decision under a plain error or abuse of discretion
standard. 8 6 The result would be a judicial check on military policy to ensure that First
Amendment freedoms are preserved among the citizen soldiers of American society.

See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,525-26 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun declined to establish how much the traditional test for
religious freedom should be modified in the military context. In his view, the Air Force's
claim that the need for uniformity justified the prohibition of wearing yarmulkes indoors
failed to meet a minimal standard of a justifiable reason for refusing First Amendment
protections. Id.; see also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 772 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(observing that a public comment about a prominent public issue cannot plausibly be
construed as a detriment to military discipline).
181 See Robbins, supra note 13, at 788-95 (discussing the Court's reluctance to decide
military issues due to concerns about technical knowledge and inappropriate interference
with military affairs).
182 Lederer & Zeliff, supra note 21, at 36.
183 This action complements the military's own policing the overuse of Article 92 or the
general articles.
'84 UCMJ art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2000).
185 The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is an
Article I court
consisting of five civilian judges appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of
180

the Senate, for fifteen-year terms. THE UNrrED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FORCES 1 (2006), available at http://www.armfor.uscourtsgov.

FOR THE ARMED

186 If the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces hears a case, it may be
appealed directly to the Supreme Court. If the military appellate court refuses to hear a case,
the case may be heard by the Supreme Court only on a collateral matter, such as a writ of
habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2000); see also supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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3. Decriminalizing the Violation of Speech Restrictive Policies
In recognition of the First Amendment sacrifices made by servicemembers, the
military should manage violations of legitimate speech-restriction policies with
administrative measures rather than criminal sanctions. Certain military functions
that require speech restrictions can still be enumerated as criminal UCMJ violations
with clear elements, such as Article 104, "Aiding the enemy,"' 87 or Article 134, disloyal statements. 88 Institutional policies that are developed to instill discipline or
protect morale, but do not rise to the level of affecting immediate military necessity,' 89 should be handled under the UCMJ's non-judicial administrative remedies.'g°
Administrative repercussions available to military commanders include forfeiture
of pay, restriction to the military unit, and a reduction in rank.' 91 The military
administrative systems do afford options for discharges, including those other than
honorable.' 92 Thus, the administrative remedies offer proportional punishment
without criminalizing what is normally a protected First Amendment right.
Removing the threat of criminal sanction for speech restrictions tangentially
related to military discipline and morale demonstrates an appreciation for the First
Amendment rights of servicemembers. '93 Decriminalizing conduct that is considered a fundamental freedom for all other Americans better aligns the UCMJ with

187

10 U.S.C.A. § 904 (West Supp. 2007). This article includes any correspondence or

communication with an enemy by a member of the armed forces, regardless of the "intent,
content, and method of the communication." MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL: UNITED
STATES, supra note 4, at pt. IV, 28(c)(6)(a).
188 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000) ("General article"). "Disloyal statements" is a sub-specification
available under the general article that involves "attacking the war aims of the United States,
or denouncing our form of government with the intent to promote disloyalty or disaffection

among members of the armed services." MANUAL FOR

COURTS-MARTIAL: UNITED STATES,

supra note 4, at pt. IV, I 72(c). The difference between this article and Article 88, besides
its applicability to all servicemembers, is that the disloyal statements charge is for disloyalty
"to the United States as a political entity and not merely to a department or other agency that
is part of its administration." Id.
189 These policies might include base restrictions on certain speech that a commander
determines is directly affecting discipline but would not include speech that rises to a specific
UCMJ violation, such as urging subordinates to disregard orders in a combat zone.
" For an explanation of the military's administrative discipline system, see supra note 56.
191 UCMJ art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (Supp. II 2002).
192 Id. The potential for a discharge without honor in the administrative system alleviates
concerns that the lack of criminal sanctions will result in less motivation for troops'
obedience. See Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 81, at 404.
193See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 530-31 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,

dissenting) (arguing that instead of striking down the military petitioner's First Amendment
claim, the majority should have upheld "the special importance of defending our Nation
without abandoning completely the freedoms that make it worth defending").

20071

2SECOND CLASS CrrIZEN SOLDIERS

the underlying principles of the Constitution. 94 Such a delineation also furthers the
clarification of what constitutes a compelling military need and reduces the vagueness currently surrounding the status of servicemembers' First Amendment rights.
B. Authority for Recommendations
The Constitution does not indicate how Congress should incorporate the Bill of
Rights into its regulation of the military, 95 but it does clearly grant Congress the
authority "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of land and naval
Forces."' 96 Historical evidence indicates that the Framers did not want the military
to have more autonomy than other parts of the government.' 97 The Declaration of
Independence criticized King George for succumbing to the English military's will
and allowing it to remain independent of civil power. 98 In fact, the Bill of Rights
was composed, in part, to ensure protection from an overreaching military. 99
The Supreme Court held that Congress's power to regulate the military is "broad
and sweeping" in United States v. O'Brien."° In the context of due process rights
in the military, the Court has viewed the UCMJ as Congress's constitutional
exercise of military regulation and has not imposed judicial protections outside of
the military systems already in place.2 ' The Court explicitly stated that the judiciary
should not interfere with military affairs unless Congress specifically invites the
judiciary's involvement.2 2 Thus, the Court established Congress as the appropriate
branch to provide constitutional protections to servicemembers, including the
delineation of when civilian courts can review military policies.
See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669,708 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Soldiers ought not be asked to defend a Constitution indifferent to
their essential human dignity.").
'9' Bilello, supranote 92, at 471.
196 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
19 Robbins, supra note 13, at 787.
' '

198

Id.

' Id. at 788. Given that the Bill of Rights enumerates specific protections from the
military, such as the protection from forceful quartering of troops and from seizure of private
property for public use, it seems inconsistent to think that the Framers would allow the
military to suspend, without clear forewarning in its regulations, the constitutional freedoms
of its members. See U.S. CONST. amend. III-V.
200 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that prosecution under the Universal Military
Training and Service Act for burning a selective service registration certificate did not
violate petitioner's First Amendment rights).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987). In Stanley, the Court refused
to afford a remedy to a former soldier suffering negative affects from LSD administered to
him without his knowledge as part of an army experiment because there was no
congressionally authorized recourse. Id. at 683.
202 "[C]ongressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is
inappropriate." Id.
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Particular motivation exists for Congress to involve itself in correcting the
seeming lack of First Amendment protection of troops given its initial hesitancy to
approve Article 88.203 The chairman of the New York County Lawyer's Association's Committee on Military Justice urged that the Senate should give special
consideration to Article 88's restriction of speech to avoid inflicting "the political
martyrdom of service personnel."'2 "4 The Senate listened, debating whether such a
restrictive article should be passed. Senator Kefauver noted that there was no reason
"why Congress should be immune from criticism," and that "our greatest reservoir
of men who may take part in public life, or should take part, would come from men
who are officers, retired officers, or Reserve."2 5 Senator Kefauver's statements
were met with agreement, but members of the committee also expressed uneasiness
about the possibility of a soldier criticizing the government on the weekend and then
reporting for duty on Monday.2 "6 Ultimately, the Senate compromised by limiting
Article 88's application to commissioned officers currently on active duty.2" 7 Given
its constitutional authority and the Supreme Court's deference, Congress is the
primary governmental body to affect change in the military.
C. Policy Arguments for Change
1. Congress
Besides a general public image concern that Congress does not itself value the
constitutional rights of servicemembers,2 °s Congress has a vested interest in promoting
203

Kester, supra note 40, at 1718-19. Although the House passed Article 88, 10 U.S.C.

§ 888 (Supp. H 2002), with little discussion, several senators discussed concern over the
restriction of speech on the floor. The committee that reviewed the article tried to limit its
chance of use by restricting its application to commissioned officers. Kester, supranote 40,
at 1718-19.
24 Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice: HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
of the S. Comm. on
Armed Servs., 81 st Cong. (1949), reprintedin INDEX AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: UNIFORM
CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 209 (2000) [hereinafter UCMJ Subcomm. Hearings] (statement
of Richard H. Wels, Chairman, New York County Lawyer's Association). Although Article
88's commentary says that it ordinarily should not be used to prosecute political
conversation, the Article is not especially effective in protecting troops' political speech. See
supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
205 UCMJ Subcomm. Hearings,supra note 204, at 331-32 (statement of Sen. Kefauver,
Member, S. Comm. on Armed Servs.).
206 Id. at 332 (statement of Sen. Saltonstall, Member, S. Comm. on Armed Servs.).
207 Kester, supra note 40, at 1718.
208 Congress does not have the best track record of safeguarding traditional constitutional
principles in a military context. Congress has:
delegate[d] the authority to define the factors leading to the death
penalty in military capital cases to the President;... require[d] only
males to register for the draft; [selectively] determine[d] whether and
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a culture more accepting of alternative, and even dissenting, ideas within the rank
structure. °9 Congress is obligated by the Constitution to provide oversight of the
armed forces. 210 If the generals who provide information to Congress on the state
of affairs are afraid to criticize military operations or presidential military directives
because of Article 88 or for fear of other professional repercussions in a culture that
stresses obedience, how can Congress get the information needed to provide meaningful oversight? The issue may seem relatively inconsequential during times of
21
peace, but it looms ominously during times of war--especially a controversial war. '
The necessity of open military communication is even more vital to the balance of
powers when Congress and the President are from different political parties.
2. Military
The military will also benefit from implementing heightened First Amendment
protections among its ranks, although the immediate criticism of the proposed
recommendations is that the military courts will grant their own commanders the
same deference as the federal courts currently do. 22 There are also concerns that
servicemembers who utilize speech will suffer institutional prejudice. Professional
repercussions for officers who challenge traditional doctrine or propose change,
even positive change if it is against a certain status quo, can result in failure to
promote and even dismissal from the service.2 3 The danger of such institutional
when to accommodate those who invoke [the Free Exercise Clause] of
the First Amendment; and ...

ban[ned] political speeches and the

distribution of leaflets on military reservations.
Robbins, supra note 13, at 775.
209 By using the word "dissenting" I do not imply that Congress should encourage
military officers to act contrary to traditional rank structure; I merely mean to suggest that
diverse opinions, even those contrary to the status quo, should be solicited by military
leadership and Congress-preferably before final policy directives are promulgated. See
Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 81, at 405-06 (discussing concerns that too much free
expression in the military runs the risk of turning the armed forces into a political entity and
threatens civilian control of the military).
210 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-14.
211

See, e.g., Thomas E. Ricks & Ann Scott Tyson, Abizaid Says Withdrawal Would Mean

More Unrest, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2006, at A22 (reporting several members of the Senate

Armed Services Committee's disappointment with General Abizaid's testimony about Iraqi
War strategy because they believed he was sticking too closely to the status quo).
212 See Lederer & Zeliff, supranote 21, at 28 (explaining the lack ofjudicial independence
in the militaryjustice system because military judges' evaluations and promotions are written
by senior officers assessing their rulings).
213 See Kaplan, supra note 7, at 38. Kaplan details Army Colonel H. R. McMaster's
failure to promote to brigadier-general two years in a row, despite being commended by
President Bush and General Petreaus for his innovative strategy when commanding a
campaign on Tal Afar, Iraq and writing a book that the Army recommends its officers read.
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backlash is the continued repression of speech in military culture.2" 4 However, the
American military, as a protector of a free and democratic society, should also lead
with the principles it protects. The military is considered by academics as a leader
of society and is based on a citizen-soldier concept. 215 From the War of Independence onward, Americans have embraced the idea that the military and citizenship are
closely connected because service is seen as an obligation of citizenship.2 6 The
modem UCMJ is based on many of General Ansell's original ideas about how the
military functioned best and retained its legitimacy by incorporating the principles
of citizenship.2 17 The military's contentment to follow far behind the rest of society
in the protection of First Amendment freedoms, even in light of military necessity,

is contrary to its founding ideals.
The expectation of blind discipline and the "society apart" concept of the
military developed before the institution of an all-volunteer force and are archaic
leadership styles inconsistent with today's military.2 18 In particular, the average
military member today is more educated than the soldier of the past.21 9 Most
drastically, the percentage of enlisted personnel who reported having at least one

year of college education rose from about thirty percent in 1985 to seventy-four
percent in 1999.220 Many of those members reported earning college credits through
The book, ironically, studies the Vietnam War and "conclude[s] that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in the 1960s betrayed their professional obligations by failing to provide unvarnished
military advice to President... Johnson." Id.; see also Carol Rosenberg, Gitmo Defense
Whiz Forced Out, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A7. Lieutenant Commander Charles
Swift, the Navy JAG assigned to defend Osama bin Laden's driver, was forced to retire
after the Navy failed to promote him a second time. Id. Lieutenant Commander Swift won
his client's case against the government. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
214 Kaplan notes that the professional repercussions suffered by Army leaders who attempt

to challenge policies or introduce alternative ideas result in other officers not attempting to
improve strategy, particularly in relation to the Iraq War, out of fear of negative career
consequences. Kaplan, supra note 7, at 38-39.
215 See LINDLEY, supra note 22, at 1.
216 Id. ("The fundamental premise underlying this image of the American citizen soldier
is the idea that Washington and his many civilian successors in arms became soldiers... because they were citizens. For them citizenship included the obligation for national service.").
217 Id. at 182-83.
218 See Zillman & Imwinkehied, supra note 81, at 400.
219 In 2000, 42.6 percent of officers had advanced degrees, compared to 25.3 percent in
1974. In 2000, 94.7 percent of enlisted personnel had at least a high school diploma, up from
79.8 percent in 1974. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MITARY PERSONNEL: ATrivE DUTY
BENEFITS REFLECT CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS, BUT OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE 30

(2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02935.pdf. Moreover, more people
now join the military with the intent of using the job training and/or the G.I. Bill as.a means
to further their educational goals for post-military jobs. America's Military Population,
POPULATION BULL., Dec. 2004, at 8.
220

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND COMPENSATION OF
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tuition assistance programs while on active duty. 22 ' These statistics indicate a
population of subordinates who are actively engaging in learning and challenging
their minds outside of their military jobs. Using an outdated management model
focused on overly restrictive control of personal liberties is counterproductive,
especially considering the intelligent and motivated nature of the modem enlistee.222
In contrast to its "society apart" label, the military is growing increasingly
similar to civilian society. 223 The military is a large and diverse organization with
training and pay scales that attempt to parallel civilian opportunities.2 24 Officer
training also focuses on civilian-developed leadership models. 225 As military
management and culture shifts closer to civilian models, traditional overreaching
First Amendment restrictions, especially at the local command level, will become
a greater source of contention. In aggregate, the discontent and feeling of
oppression caused by unnecessary restrictions on free speech arguably degrade
military morale, cohesiveness, and effectiveness more than the dissenting or unique
speech that is prohibited.
One wonders if discipline might actually be improved in a system that, when not
prohibited by actual combat, explains orders. Especially with the greater mobilization of reservists who are civilian professionals, the civilian management models
that officers study could be integrated into command frameworks. Perhaps the
dynamic leadership methods encouraged by ending the use of speech prohibition as
a control method would prevent situations such as the refusal of nineteen members
in a reserve unit to drive a convoy in Iraq. The reservists refused the order because
they believed their equipment was inadequate to protect against attacks.226 The
armed forces indisputably need personnel to unquestioningly follow orders in
combat, but overall loyalty and cohesion may be increased, and situations such as
the reservists' refusal avoided, if members felt they were valued as citizen soldiers
rather than expendable cogs in a military machine.
A troubling result of active duty senior military leadership not criticizing (or at
least not giving honest assessments on the challenges of) current Iraqi War strategy
is increasing disillusionment and frustration with senior leadership among junior

ENLISTED PERSONNEL4

(2004), availableat http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5108

&sequence= 1#pt2.
223

Id.
See Dienes, supra note 108, at 816.
Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 81, at 400.
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Id.

221
222

Id. The federal military service academies incorporate leadership training into their
curricula that includes civilian business management models. See, e.g., United States Coast
Guard Academy Leadership Development Center, http://www.uscga.edu/ldc/default/aspx
(last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
226 SeeThomasE. Ricks, Probe ofReservists Underway,WASH. POST, Oct. 16,2004, atA14.
225
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officers.227 Some junior officers are particularly disappointed with the perceived
inability of senior officers to articulate downfalls with military strategy, including
required troop strength, because they have more combat experience than senior
leadership and are bearing the consequences of the generals' silence during the
continual cycle of lengthy combat tours.228 The military cannot, and should not,
lower the level of expected discipline among its members, but it may be time to shift
from a nearly entirely fear-based motivating structure to a more dynamic management philosophy.
CONCLUSION

As a defender and leader of a free country, the military cannot retain legitimacy
if it continues to arbitrarily suppress the speech rights of its members. The
Constitution clearly grants Congress broad powers to regulate the military and
provide oversight. In light of the Supreme Court's consistent refusal to analyze
military First Amendment claims under the separation of powers and political
question doctrines, Congress must fulfill its responsibilities to the members of the
armed forces. By directing the military to include First Amendment considerations
in policy development, emphasizing a modified traditional First Amendment review
of First Amendment claims in the military justice system, and decriminalizing
infractions of speech-restrictive military policies, Congress can ensure that the First
Amendment rights of servicemembers are protected while they serve. These
proposals align military practice with its founding ideals and ensure that the
American citizens who sacrifice so much for their country will not also unduly
sacrifice their rights.

227 Kaplan, supra note 7, at 36-37. For a bluntly critical assessment of current military
leadership written by an active duty Army Lieutenant Colonel, see Paul Yingling, A Failure

in Generalship,ARMED FORCES J., May 2007, availableat http://www.armedforcesjoumal
.com/2007/05/2635198/.
228

Kaplan, supra note 7, at 36. Junior officer discontent in the Army was reflected by

forty-four percent of the officers from the West Point class of 2001 leaving the Army when
their five-year term of obligated service ended in 2006-the highest loss rate experienced
by the Army in thirty years. Id.

